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THE SINGLE-SUBJECT RULE:
A STATE CONSTITUTIONAL DILEMMA
Richard Briffault*
I. INTRODUCTION
Critics of the proliferation of omnibus legislation in Congress have
pointed to the constitutions of the American states as providing an
alternative, and potentially superior, model for lawmaking.1 Fortythree state constitutions include some sort of “single-subject” rule,
that is, the requirement that each act of the legislature be limited to
a single subject.2 Many of these provisions date back to the second
quarter of the nineteenth century, and, collectively, they have been
the subject of literally thousands of court decisions.3 Nor is the rule
a relic from a bygone era; one recent study found the rule at stake in
102 cases in 2016 alone.4 Many of these decisions have involved
controversial, hot-button issues. In the last two decades, state courts
Joseph P. Chamberlain Professor of Legislation, Columbia University School of Law.
See, e.g., Brannon P. Denning & Brooks R. Smith, The Truth-in-Legislation Amendment:
An Idea Whose Time has Come, 78 TENN. L. REV. 831, 832 (2011) [hereinafter Denning & Smith,
The Truth-in-Legislation Amendment]; Brannon P. Denning & Brooks R. Smith, Uneasy Riders:
The Case for a Truth-in-Legislation Amendment, 1999 UTAH L. REV. 957, 958, 962–63 (1999)
[hereinafter Denning & Smith, Uneasy Riders]; M. Albert Figinski, Maryland’s Constitutional
One-Subject Rule: Neither a Dead Letter nor an Undue Restriction, 27 U. BALT. L. REV. 363,
390–91, 393–94 (1998).
2 See Michael D. Gilbert, Single Subject Rules and the Legislative Process, 67 U. PITT. L.
REV. 803, 812 (2006).
3 See id. at 812, 820. Gilbert’s count includes cases dealing with voter initiatives. See id. at
819. Twenty-four states provide for the voter initiative process, and eighteen of those states
require voter initiatives to comply with a single-subject requirement. See generally Rachel
Downey et al., A Survey of the Single Subject Rule as Applied to Statewide Initiatives, 13 J.
CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 579 (2004) (surveying the application of a voter initiative process and
a single subject rule among the states). Voter initiatives pose distinctive issues with respect to
the potential value of a single-subject requirement. See Mary-Beth Moylan, Something for
Everyone? The Future of Comprehensive Criminal Justice Initiatives After Senate v. Jones and
Manduley v. Superior Court, 33 MCGEORGE L. REV. 779, 781 (2002); see also Kurt G. Kastorf,
Comment, Logrolling Gets Logrolled: Same-Sex Marriage, Direct Democracy, and the Single
Subject Rule, 54 EMORY L.J. 1633, 1639 (2005). This Article focuses largely on cases that apply
single-subject requirements to acts of state legislatures, and addresses analyses of the singlesubject rule that focus on legislative enactments rather than initiatives.
4 See Daniel N. Boger, Note, Constitutional Avoidance: The Single Subject Rule as an
Interpretive Principle, 103 VA. L. REV. 1247, 1249 (2017).
*
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have used single-subject rules to invalidate laws dealing with, inter
alia, firearms regulation,5 abortion,6 tort reform,7 immigration,8 local
minimum wage laws,9 sex offenders,10 enhanced criminal penalties,11
and school vouchers.12
Yet, despite having long been a part of the constitutional law of
most states,13 the single-subject rule is deeply problematic. Courts
and commentators have been unable to come up with a clear and
consistent definition of what constitutes a “single subject.”14 Instead,
a persistent theme in the single-subject jurisprudence has been the
inevitable “indeterminacy” of “subject”15 and a recognition that
whether a measure consists of one subject or many will frequently be
“in the eye of the beholder.”16 On the one hand, as the Michigan
Supreme Court once explained, “[t]here is virtually no statute that
could not be subdivided and enacted as several bills.”17 On the other
hand, as an older Pennsylvania Supreme Court case put it, “no two
subjects are so wide apart that they may not be brought into a
common focus, if the point of view be carried back far enough.”18
In practice, the meaning and enforcement of the rule has usually
turned on how deferential the court thinks it ought to be to the
legislature or, conversely, how much it sees the combination of topics
in a new law as reflecting the legislature’s defiance of the norms of
proper law-making. Over the past century and a half, state courts
for the most part appear to have given a liberal interpretation to the
concept of “single subject” and have rejected most single-subject
5 See Unity Church v. State, 694 N.W.2d 585, 588 (Minn. Ct. App. 2005); Leach v.
Commonwealth, 141 A.3d 426, 428–29 (Pa. 2016).
6 See Burns v. Cline, 2016 OK 99, ¶1, 382 P.3d 1048, 1049.
7 See State ex rel. Ohio Acad. of Trial Lawyers v. Sheward, 715 N.E.2d 1062, 1111 (Ohio
1999); Douglas v. Cox Ret. Props, Inc., 2013 OK 37, ¶¶ 2, 12, 302 P.3d 789, 791, 794.
8 See Thomas v. Henry, 2011 OK 53, ¶¶ 25, 31, 260 P.3d 1251, 1259–60, 1261.
9 See Coop. Home Care, Inc. v. City of St. Louis, 514 S.W.3d 571, 575–76 (Mo. 2017).
10 See Commonwealth v. Neiman, 84 A.3d 603, 605–06, 613 (Pa. 2013).
11 See People v. Cervantes, 723 N.E.2d 265, 266, 268–69 (Ill. 1999).
12 See Simmons-Harris v. Goff, 711 N.E.2d 203, 207 (Ohio 1999).
13 See Gilbert, supra note 2, at 812. State constitutions and state courts are a vital but
understudied component of the American legal system, but even when scholars turn their
attentions to state constitutionalism, they tend to focus on state analogues to federal
constitutional provisions, such as those involving free speech, equality, due process, or criminal
procedure, see, e.g., JEFFREY S. SUTTON, 51 IMPERFECT SOLUTIONS: STATES AND THE MAKING
OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 8 (2018), rather than on the legislative process restrictions
that are a truly distinctive feature of state constitutionalism.
14 See Daniel H. Lowenstein, California Initiatives and the Single-Subject Rule, 30 UCLA L.
REV. 936, 938 (1983).
15 See Or. Educ. Ass’n v. Phillips, 727 P.2d 602, 612 (Or. 1986) (Linde, J., concurring).
16 See Lowenstein, supra note 14, at 938.
17 People v. Kevorkian, 527 N.W.2d 714, 722 (Mich. 1994).
18 Payne v. Sch. Dist. of Borough of Coudersport, 31 A. 1072, 1074 (Pa. 1895).
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challenges to state legislation.19 Even with the uptick in findings of
violations in recent decades,20 the meaning of the rule remains
murky, with the case law consisting of a mix of unpredictable “I know
it when I see it” decisions.21
Due to the slipperiness of “subject,” many analyses have focused on
what are regularly said to be the primary purposes of the rule—the
prevention of legislative logrolling and riders, and the promotion of a
more orderly and informed legislative process—and have called for
reframing the enforcement of the rule around the advancement of
these goals.22 But determining whether a law is the product of
logrolling, or whether a provision should be treated as a rider, will
often be difficult.23 Moreover, it is far from clear that logrolls and
riders are as pernicious as proponents of more vigorous enforcement
of the single-subject rule assume.24 So, too, the more aggressive use
of the single-subject rule urged by advocates as a means of thwarting
“legislative chicanery”25 and “backroom politics”26 could also undo the
cooperation and compromise necessary to get difficult but important
legislation enacted.
Part II of this Article briefly reviews the history and purposes
behind the single-subject rule. Part III examines how state courts
have applied the single-subject rule, with particular attention to
some recent state supreme court single-subject cases interpreting the

19 The leading study of the first century of the single-subject is Millard Ruud, No Law Shall
Embrace More than One Subject, 42 MINN. L. REV. 389 (1958). Professor Ruud concluded that
“the one-subject rule . . . appears as a weak and undependable arrow in [the] quiver” of anyone
challenging state legislation. Id. at 447. Nearly sixty years later, another comprehensive study
similarly concluded that “most states have . . . given little weight to their respective single
subject rules.” Justin W. Evans & Mark. C. Bannister, Reanimating the States’ Single Subject
Jurisprudence: A New Constitutional Test, 39 S. ILL. U. L.J. 163, 163 (2015); see also Porten
Sullivan Corp. v. State, 568 A.2d 1111, 1118 (Md. 1990) (citing Scharf v. Tasker, 21 A. 56 (Md.
1891); Curtis v. MacTier, 80 A. 1066, 1069 (Md. 1991)) (noting only two violations in 139 years);
Unity Church v. State, 694 N.W.2d 585, 592 (Minn. Ct. App. 2005) (noting that Minnesota had
found only five single-subject violations in 148 years).
20 See Denning & Smith, Uneasy Riders, supra note 1, at 996–97; Martha J. Dragich, State
Constitutional Restrictions on Legislative Procedure: Rethinking the Analysis of Original
Purpose, Single Subject, and Clear Title Challenges, 38 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 103, 107–08 (2001).
21 Cf. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring) (finding in the
context of pornography, a hardline rule could not be created and instead claimed to know it
when he saw it); see also Denning & Smith, Uneasy Riders, supra note 1, at 996.
22 See, e.g., Ruud, supra note 19, at 391.
23 See Boger, supra note 4, at 1270; Denning & Smith, The Truth-in-Legislation Amendment,
supra note 1, at 835.
24 Contra Denning & Smith, Uneasy Riders, supra note 1, at 971; Gilbert, supra note 2, at
814.
25 See Denning & Smith, The Truth-in-Legislation Amendment, supra note 1, at 832.
26 Alexander R. Knoll, Note, Tipping Point: Missouri Single Subject Provision, 72 MO. L.
REV. 1387, 1387 (2007).
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rule. Part IV focuses on arguments for reframing enforcement of the
rule more tightly around its purposes, particularly the goals of
preventing logrolling or riders. Part V concludes by reflecting on the
significance of the failure of the rule to achieve its goal of reforming
state legislative processes.
II. THE HISTORY AND PURPOSES OF THE SINGLE-SUBJECT RULE
A. History
Scholars have traced concerns about omnibus legislation and the
norm of requiring laws to be limited to a single subject to the Lex
Cecilia Didia of the Roman Republic.27 Early instances of singlesubject requirements in the American setting include a complaint by
the Privy Council about the practices of the legislature of the
Massachusetts Bay Colony,28 and a 1702 directive of Queen Anne to
the royal governor of the New Jersey colony against the adoption of
laws “intermixing in one . . . Act” unrelated subjects.29
The
constitutions—federal and state—adopted after the Revolution did
not include a single-subject requirement.30 But that soon changed.
The early nineteenth century witnessed growing popular discontent
with the performance of state legislatures, including such abuses as
“[l]ast-minute consideration of important measures, logrolling,
mixing substantive provisions in omnibus bills, low visibility and
hasty enactment of important, and sometimes corrupt, legislation,
and the attachment of unrelated provisions in the amendment
process . . . .”31 In response, the states amended their constitutions
to impose new constraints on their legislatures.32 Some of these were
substantive, such as limits on state spending, lending, and borrowing
intended to prevent the practices that got many states into fiscal
difficulties in the 1830s and 1840s.33 Others were procedural, and
were intended to promote legislative accountability and
deliberation.34 These included, inter alia, requirements that votes be
27 See, e.g., ROBERT LUCE, LEGISLATIVE PROCEDURE: PARLIAMENTARY PRACTICES AND THE
COURSE OF BUSINESS IN THE FRAMING OF STATUTES 548 (1922).
28 See id. at 549–50.
29 See Gilbert, supra note 2, at 811.
30 See Robert F. Williams, State Constitutional Limits on Legislative Procedure: Legislative
Compliance and Judicial Enforcement, 48 PITT. L. REV. 797, 798 (1987).
31 Id.
32 See City of Philadelphia v. Commonwealth, 838 A.2d 566, 588 (Pa. 2003).
33 See RICHARD BRIFFAULT & LAURIE REYNOLDS, STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW 817–
18 (8th ed. 2016).
34 See Williams, supra note 31, at 798–99.

THE SINGLE SUBJECT RULE

2018/2019]

9/18/2019 6:49 PM

The Single-Subject Rule

1633

reflected in the legislature’s journal; that no bill be altered during the
legislative process so as to change its legislative purpose; that bills
must “age” a certain number of days before they can be voted on; that
each bill have a title clearly disclosing its subject—and that each bill
be limited to a single subject.35
Illinois was the first to adopt a single-subject requirement when it
amended its constitution in 1818 to direct that bills appropriating
salaries for government officials be limited to that subject.36
Michigan in 1843 limited laws authorizing the borrowing of money or
the issuance of state stock to a single object.37 In 1844, New Jersey
adopted the first general single-subject requirement.38 Thereafter,
the idea spread quickly. Today, forty-three states, including every
state that entered the Union after 1844, include some version of the
single-subject rule in their constitutions, almost always in the same
sentence as the clear-title requirement.39
There are some variations across the states constitutions in the
language and scope of the rule. Two states apply the requirement
only to appropriations bills, and another two states limit it to bills
adopting special or local laws.40 Conversely, a few states exempt
appropriations bills from the single-subject requirement,41 and some
states exclude bills “for the codification, revision or rearrangement of
laws.”42 A handful of states use the term “object” rather than
“subject,” although that does not appear to have had any legal
significance.43 Notwithstanding these variations, some version of the
single-subject requirement is widespread, with roughly threequarters of state legislatures subject to the rule for most
enactments.44 It is probably the “most significant, and therefore most
litigated procedural requirement” in state constitutions.45 The
language of the Ohio Constitution is typical: “No bill shall contain
more than one subject, which shall be clearly expressed in its title.”46

See id.
See Ruud, supra note 19, at 389.
37 See id. at 389–90.
38 See id. at 390.
39 See, e.g., Michael W. Catalano, The Single Subject Rule: A Check on Anti-Majoritarian
Logrolling, 3 EMERGING ISSUES ST. CONST. L. 77, 80 (1990).
40 See id.
41 See Ruud, supra note 19, at 416.
42 See, e.g., ILL. CONST. art IV, § 8(d).
43 See Ruud, supra note 19, at 390.
44 See id.
45 See Michael J. Kasper, Using Article IV of the Illinois Constitution to Attack Legislation
Passed by the General Assembly, 40 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 847, 848 (2009).
46 OHIO CONST. art. II, § 15.
35
36
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B. Purposes
The purposes of the single-subject rule are briefly stated and often
repeated: the prevention of logrolling and riders; orderly legislative
procedure that promotes informed legislative decision-making and
public accountability;47 and, less frequently, the protection of the
governor’s veto power.48 Logrolling and riders, in particular, have
been most frequently cited as the “evils” against which the singlesubject rule is aimed.49 The two terms are sometimes blurred
together,50 but they refer to somewhat different forms of legislative
action. “Logrolling” is used to describe what occurs when two or more
separate proposals, none of which is able to command majority
support, are combined so that the minorities behind each measure
aggregate to a majority capable of passing the resulting bill.51 A
“rider” is a provision which could not pass on its own but is then
attached to a bill considered likely to pass and so “rides” on that more
popular measure to enactment.52
Both logrolling and riders have been sharply criticized because
they lead to the adoption of measures that do not enjoy true majority
47 See, e.g., Wirtz v. Quinn, 2011 IL 111903, ¶ 13 (quoting Johnson v. Edgar, 680 N.E.2d
1372, 1379 (Ill. 1997)); Ruud, supra note 19, at 391.
48 See, e.g., Migdal v. State, 747 A.2d 1225, 1229 (Md. 2000); Hammerschmidt v. Boone Cty.,
877 S.W.2d 98, 102 (Mo. 1994); In re Initiative Petition No. 382, 2006 OK 45, ¶ 8 n.11, 142 P.3d
400, 405 n.11 (citing Johnson v. Walters, 1991 OK 107, ¶ 14, 819 P.2d 694, 697); Dragich, supra
note 20, at 115; Justin W. Evans & Mark. C. Bannister, The Meaning and Purposes of State
Constitutional Single Subject Rules: A Survey of States and the Indiana Example, 49 VAL. U.L.
REV. 87, 151–52 (2014); Figinski, supra note 1, at 365–66.
49 See, e.g., Stephanie Hoffer, Of Disunity and Logrolling: Ohio’s One-Subject Rule and the
Very Evils it was Designed to Prevent, 51 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 557, 558–59 (2004); Ruud, supra
note 19, at 398 (“[L]og-rolling is the evil at which the one-subject rule is aimed . . . .”); cf. In re
Title, Ballot Title & Submission Clause for 2005-2006 No. 74, 136 P.3d 237, 243 (Co.
2006) (Coats, J., dissenting) (first citing Catron v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs, 33 P. 513, 514 (Colo.
1893); then citing In re Breene, 24 P. 3, 3–4 (Colo. 1890); then citing In re Ballot Title &
Submission Clause for Proposed Initiative 2001-2002 No. 43, 46 P.3d 438, 440 (Colo. 2002); and
then citing In re Title, Ballot, Title & Submission Clause for 2003-2004 No. 32 & No. 33, 76
P.3d 460, 471 (Colo. 2003) (Coats, J., dissenting)) (“[B]oth case law and legislative history make
clear that this provision must be understood as directed against two specific evils: 1) increasing
voting power by combining measures that could not be carried on their individual merits, and
2) surprising voters by surreptitiously including unknown and alien subjects ‘coiled up in the
folds’ of the proposal.”).
50
See, e.g., State ex rel. Ohio AFL-CIO v. Voinovich, 631 N.E.2d 582, 604 (Ohio 1994)
(Sweeney, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Fent v. State, ex rel. Okla. Capitol
Improvement Auth., 2009 OK 15, ¶ 14 n.18, 214 P.3d 799, 804 n.18; Dragich, supra note 20, at
161–62 (analyzing two cases in which it was hard to say whether a single-subject violation
involved a logroll or a rider).
51 See Commonwealth v. Neiman, 84 A.3d 603, 611 (Pa. 2013) (quoting City of Philadelphia
v. Commonwealth, 838 A.2d 566, 589 (Pa. 2003)).
52 See Gilbert, supra note 2, at 815; James Preston Schuck, Returning the “One” to Ohio’s
“One-Subject” Rule, 28 CAP. U. L. REV. 899, 902 (2000).
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support within the legislature, and, to the extent that legislators
accurately represent the views of their constituents, within the state
as a whole.53 Some courts have also emphasized the degree to which
logrolls and riders interfere with the freedom of legislators by
presenting them with the “Hobson’s choice” of being “forced to assent
to an unfavorable provision to secure passage of a favorable one, or
conversely, forced to vote against a favorable provision to ensure that
an unfavorable provision is not enacted.”54
Beyond the prevention of logrolling and riders, many courts and
commentators cite improved legislative deliberation, greater
transparency, and the resulting greater accountability to the public
as purposes of the single-subject rule.55 As the Illinois Supreme
Court recently explained, one reason for the single-subject rule “is to
promote an orderly legislative process. ‘By limiting each bill to a
single subject, the issues presented by each bill can be better grasped
and more intelligently discussed.’”56 The Missouri Supreme Court
similarly asserted that by limiting each bill to a single subject, the
rule enables bills to “be easily understood and intelligently discussed,
both by legislators and the general public.”57
So, too, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court has urged that the general aim of the
rule is to “place restraints on the legislative process and encourage
an open, deliberative, and accountable government.”58 The intuition
is that when a bill is limited to a single subject, it is easier for
legislators to more fully understand the ramifications of enactment
and for the public to know what their legislators are up to.59 That
can facilitate public input while the measure is pending, or voter
efforts to hold legislators accountable after enactment.60 Supporters
See Shuck, supra note 52, at 901–02.
In re Initiative Petition No. 382, 2006 OK 45, ¶ 8, 142 P.3d 400, 405; accord Porten
Sullivan Corp. v. State, 568 A.2d 1111, 1121 (Md. 1990) (“To avoid the necessity for a legislator
to acquiesce in a bill he or she opposes in order to secure useful and necessary legislation . . . .”).
55 See, e.g., Wirtz v. Quinn, 2011 IL 111903, ¶ 13, 953 N.E.2d 899, 904–05 (quoting Johnson
v. Edgar, 680 N.E.2d 1372, 1379 (Ill. 1997)); Kasper, supra note 45, at 848–49; Ruud, supra
note 19, at 391; Schuck, supra note 52, at 903.
56 Wirtz, 2011 IL 111903, ¶ 13, 953 N.E.2d at 905 (quoting Johnson, 680 N.E.2d at 1379)
(citing People v. Wooters, 722 N.E.2d 1102, 1113 (Ill. 1999)).
57 See Rizzo v. State, 189 S.W.3d 576, 578 (Mo. 2006) (citing Hammerschmidt v. Boone Cty.,
877 S.W.2d 98, 101 (Mo. 1994)); see also Mo. Roundtable for Life, Inc. v. State, 396 S.W.3d 348,
351 (Mo. 2013) (“Procedural safeguards also ensure that members of the legislature and the
public are aware of the subject matter of pending laws.”).
58 Pennsylvanians Against Gambling Expansion Fund, Inc. v. Commonwealth, 877 A.2d 383,
395 (Pa. 2005) (quoting City of Philadelphia v. Commonwealth, 838 A.2d 566, 585 (Pa. 2003)).
59 See Mo. Roundtable for Life, Inc., 396 S.W.3d at 351 (citing Stroh Brewery Co. v. State,
954 S.W.2d 323, 325–26 (Mo. 1997)); Shuck, supra note 52, at 902.
60 See Wirtz, 2011 IL 111903, ¶ 13, 953 N.E.2d at 905 (citing Johnson v. Edgar, 680 N.E.2d
1372, 1379 (Ill. 1997)); City of Philadelphia, 838 A.2d at 585.
53
54
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of the rule have also expressed the hopeful assumption that it will
“prevent surprise and fraud upon the people and the legislature” by
barring special interest groups from hiding deals or giveaways in long
and complex multi-subject measures.61
III. THE SINGLE-SUBJECT RULE IN THE COURTS
A. Subject
Courts have regularly recognized the intrinsic difficulty of defining
“subject” for purposes of enforcing the single-subject requirement. As
the Utah Supreme Court recently acknowledged, a “precise
formula . . . may well be impossible to craft . . . .”62 Other courts have
agreed that “[f]or purposes of legislation, ‘subjects’ are not absolute
existences to be discovered by some sort of a priori reasoning, but are
the result of classification for convenience of treatment and for
greater effectiveness in attaining the general purpose of the
particular legislative act.”63 As Professor Daniel Hays Lowenstein
has emphasized, a central problem is the level of specificity required
or generality permitted in defining what constitutes a subject as
any collection of items, no matter how diverse and
comprehensive, will fall ‘within’ a single (broad) subject if one
goes high enough up . . . and, on the other hand, the most
simple and specific idea can always be broken down into parts,
which may in turn plausibly be regarded as separate (narrow)
subjects.64
Some courts have emphasized the need to take a broad approach to
defining “subject.” The Utah Supreme Court has emphasized that
“[t]here is no constitutional restriction as to the scope or magnitude
of the single subject of a legislative act.”65 The Illinois Supreme Court
61 Otto v. Wright Co., 910 N.W.2d 446, 456 (Minn. 2018) (quoting Johnson v. Harrison, 50
N.W. 923, 924 (Minn. 1891)); see In re Ballot Title and Submission Clause for 2013-2014 no.
129, 2014 CO 53, ¶ 14 (quoting In re Title & Ballot Title & Submission Clause for 2005-2006
No. 55, 138 P.3d 273, 276–77 (Colo. 2006)); Stroh Brewery Co., 954 S.W.2d at 325 (“[T]hese
constitutional limitations function in the legislative process to facilitate orderly procedure,
avoid surprise, and prevent ‘logrolling’ . . . .”).
62 Gregory v. Shurtleff, 2013 UT 18, ¶ 42, 299 P.3d 1098, 1113.
63 Wash. Ass’n for Substance Abuse & Violence Prevention v. State, 278 P.3d 632, 656
(Wash. 2012) (alteration in original) (quoting State ex rel. Wash. Toll Bridge Auth. v. Yelle, 377
P.2d 466, 470 (Wash. 1962)).
64 See Lowenstein, supra note 14, at 940–41.
65 Gregory, 2013 UT 18, ¶ 40, 299 P.3d at 1112 (alteration in original) (emphasis omitted)
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agreed that “[t]he subject may be as broad as the legislature
chooses,”66 albeit not “so broad that the rule is evaded as ‘a
meaningful constitutional check on the legislature’s actions’”67 –
perhaps not the most helpful formula. Indeed, some state courts have
approved as constitutionally permissible subjects such broad topics
as “land,”68 “education,”69 “transportation,”70 “utilities,”71 “state
taxation,”72 “public safety,”73 “capital projects,”74 and “operations of
state government.”75
On the other hand, some state high courts have rejected “any
broad, expansive, approach,”76 and have ruled out certain relatively
broad topics. The Maryland Court of Appeals concluded that the
purpose of “generally regulating corporations is too broad and
tenuous . . . to satisfy the one-subject requirement . . . .”77 The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court has held that “municipalities” is “too
broad to qualify for single-subject status”78 and, similarly, that
“refining civil remedies or relief” and “judicial remedies and
sanctions” are “far too expansive” to satisfy the single-subject
requirement79—although the same court also held that the
“regulation of gaming” was sufficiently narrow as to be a
constitutionally permissible subject.80
Some state constitutional provisions authorize acceptance of some
inherently broad measures, like appropriations and budget bills,

(quoting Martineau v. Crabbe, 150 P. 301, 304 (Utah 1915)).
66 Wirtz v. Quinn, 2011 IL 111903, ¶ 14, 953 N.E.2d 899, 905 (citing People v. Boclair, 789
N.E.2d 734, 746 (Ill. 2002); Johnson v. Edgar, 680 N.E.2d 1372, 1379 (Ill. 1997)).
67 Wirtz, 2011 IL 111903, ¶ 14, 953 N.E.2d at 905 (quoting Boclair, 789 N.E.2d at 746).
68 See State v. First Nat’l Bank, 660 P.2d 406, 415 (Alaska 1982).
69 See Kan. Nat’l Educ. Ass’n v. State, 387 P.3d 795, 809 (Kan. 2017) (quoting Kan. Pub.
Emps. Ret. Sys. v. Reimer & Koger Assocs., 941 P.2d 1321, 1347 (Kan. 1997)).
70 See, e.g., Yute Air Alaska, Inc. v. McAlpine, 698 P.2d 1173, 1175 (Alaska 1985); Wass v.
Anderson, 252 N.W.2d 131, 137 (Minn. 1977); C.C. Dillon Co. v. City of Eureka, 12 S.W.3d 322,
328 (Mo. 2000).
71 See Kan. One-Call Sys. v. State, 274 P.3d 625, 632–33 (Kan. 2012).
72 See N. Slope Borough v. Sohio Petroleum Corp., 585 P.2d 534, 545 (Alaska 1978).
73 See Townsend v. State, 767 N.W.2d 11, 13–14 (Minn. 2009).
74 See Wirtz v. Quinn, 2011 IL 111903, ¶ 32 , 953 N.E.2d 899, 907 (quoting People v. Boclair,
789 N.E.2d 734, 746 (Ill. 2002)) (“[C]apital projects is a legitimate single subject . . . .”).
75 See Otto v. Wright Cty., 910 N.W.2d 446, 457 (Minn. 2018) (“‘The operation of state
government’—is not too broad to pass constitutional muster.”). But see People v. Reedy, 708
N.E.2d 1114, 1119 (Ill. 1999) (rejecting subject of “governmental matters”).
76 See Fent v. State ex rel. Okla. Capitol Improvement Auth., 2009 OK 15, ¶ 20, 214 P.3d
799, 806.
77 Migdal v. State, 747 A.2d 1225, 1231 (Md. 2000).
78 City of Philadelphia v. Commonwealth, 838 A.2d 566, 589 (Pa. 2003).
79 Commonwealth v. Neiman, 84 A.3d 603, 613 (Pa. 2013).
80 See Pennsylvanians Against Gambling Expansion Fund, Inc. v. Commonwealth, 877 A.2d
383, 396 (Pa. 2005).
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codifications, and comprehensive revisions, and some courts
similarly recognized that such sweeping multi-part measures can
constitute a single subject.81 However, difficulties have arisen when
substantive law provisions are attached to appropriations bills82 and
also in defining what constitutes a permissible comprehensive
approach.
Thus, state courts have divided over whether
comprehensive tort reform constitutes a single subject. The Alaska
Supreme Court, which has generally accepted a broad definition of
subject, upheld a single tort reform law that imposed caps on
noneconomic and punitive damages, required payment of half of all
punitive damages awards to the state, created a statute of repose,
adopted a comparative allocation of fault between parties and
nonparties, provided for a revised offer of judgment procedure, and
gave hospitals partial immunity from vicarious liability for some
physicians’ actions.83 The Court acknowledged that the law’s
provisions “concern different matters” but concluded that “they are
all within the single subject of ‘civil action.’”84 The Ohio and
Oklahoma Supreme Courts, however, rejected similar measures,
finding, respectively, that “tort and other civil actions,”85 and “lawsuit
reform”86 could not be sustained as constitutionally permissible
single subjects of legislation.87 Courts have similarly struggled over
the significance of the length or number of sections of a bill or the
number of articles or titles of the state code that the measure amends.
Although longer, more complex bills are certainly more likely to be
found to violate the single-subject constraint, the fact that the bill
amends only a single article or title will not save it,88 and the fact
that it runs over one hundred pages, with dozens of chapters and
multiple sections, need not be fatal.89

See Ruud, supra note 19, at 414–19, 442–43.
See, e.g., Unity Church v. State, 694 N.W.2d 585, 593 (Minn. Ct. App. 2005); State ex rel.
Ohio Civil Serv. Emps. Ass’n v. State, 146 Ohio St. 3d 315, 2016-Ohio-478, 56 N.E.3d 913, ¶ 18
(citing State ex rel. Ohio Civ. Serv. Emps. Ass’n, AFSCME, Local 11 v. State Emp’t Relations
Bd., 104 Ohio St. 3d 122, 2004-Ohio-6363, 818 N.E.2d 688, ¶ 30) (“Biennial appropriations bills,
which fund the state’s programs and departments, necessarily address wide-ranging
topics . . . .”); Ruud, supra note 19, at 400.
83 See Evans v. State, 56 P.3d 1046, 1048 (Alaska 2002).
84 Id. at 1070.
85 State ex rel. Ohio Acad. of Trial Lawyers v. Sheward, 715 N.E.2d 1062, 1101 (Ohio 1999).
86 Douglas v. Cox Ret. Props., Inc., 2013 OK 37, ¶ 10, 302 P.3d 789, 793 (citing Campbell v.
White, 856 P.2d 255, 258 (Okla. 1993)).
87 See Sheward, 715 N.E.2d at 1101; Douglas, 2013 OK 37, ¶ 12, 302 P.3d at 794.
88 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Neiman, 84 A.3d 603, 612–13 (Pa. 2013).
89 See Wirtz v. Quinn, 2011 IL 111903, ¶ 15, 953 N.E.2d 899, 905 (citing Arangold Corp. v.
Zehnder, 718 N.E.2d 191, 198 (Ill. 1999); Cutinello v. Whitley, 641 N.E.2d 360, 366 (Ill. 1994));
Pennsylvanians Against Gambling Expansion Fund, Inc. v. Commonwealth, 877 A.2d 383, 392
81
82
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Courts frequently acknowledge the lack of clarity in their singlesubject jurisprudence. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has
candidly written that its cases indicate that “the line between what
is constitutionally acceptable and what is not is often blurred.”90
Many of the most prominent recent cases in Pennsylvania and Ohio—
two states which have witnessed considerable single-subject rule
litigation—have been marked by sharp dissents,91 with one Ohio
dissenter pointing out that in one case each justice of the state’s
supreme court authored a separate opinion, thereby demonstrating
“that there was little consensus among the justices on the rule’s
meaning.”92 A dissenting justice of the Colorado Supreme Court
similarly lamented “an unmistakable lack of uniformity in our
treatment of the single-subject requirement.”93 Even when there are
no dissents, it is sometimes difficult to find consistency in a court’s
treatment of “subject.” The Oklahoma Supreme Court, which has
had a heavy docket of single-subject cases in recent years,94
invalidated a law authorizing a single state agency to incur debt to
finance three different projects,95 and then a few years later upheld a
law authorizing a different state agency to issue bonds to finance four
(Pa. 2005) (discussing the constitutionality of a bill that was 145 pages and included seven
chapters and 86 sections); Arangold Corp., 718 N.E.2d at 197–98 (citing Cutinello, 641 N.E.2d
at 366; Johnson v. Edgar, 680 N.E.2d 1372, 1379 (Ill. 1997)) (amending over twenty separate
laws); see also Dragich, supra note 20, at 144–45 (“Provisions of the bill amending chapters 198
(nursing homes) and 660 (relating to DSS itself), though found in separate parts of the code, all
relate to the same subject—the regulation by DSS of care provided by nursing homes.”).
90 Pennsylvanians Against Gambling Expansion Fund, Inc., 877 A.2d at 400 (quoting City
of Philadelphia v. Commonwealth, 837 A.2d 591, 602 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2003)).
91 See, e.g., State ex rel. Ohio Civil Serv. Emps. Ass’n, Local 11 v. State Emp. Relations Bd.,
104 Ohio St. 3d 122, 2004-Ohio-6363; 818 N.E.2d 688, ¶ 60 (Lundberg Stratton, J., dissenting);
Sheward, 715 N.E.2d at 1124 (Lundberg Stratton, J., dissenting); Simmons-Harris v. Goff, 711
N.E.2d 203, 218 (Ohio 1999) (Baird, J., dissenting in part); State ex rel. Ohio AFL-CIO v.
Voinovich, 631 N.E.2d 582, 599–600 (Ohio 1994) (Moyer, J., dissenting in part); Neiman, 84
A.3d at 616–17 (Castille, C.J., dissenting); Pa. State Ass’n of Jury Comm’rs v. Commonwealth,
64 A.3d 611, 615 (Pa. 2013) (citing Pa. State Ass’n of Jury Comm’rs v. Commonwealth, 53 A.3d
109, 124–25 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2012) (Pellegrini, J., dissenting)); Spahn v. Zoning Bd. of
Adjustment, 977 A.2d 1132, 1156 (Pa. 2009) (Saylor, J., dissenting).
92 State Emp. Relations Bd., 104 Ohio St. 3d 122, 2004-Ohio-6363; 818 N.E.2d 688, ¶ 75
(Lundberg Stratton, J., dissenting).
93 In re Title, Ballot Title & Submission Clause for 2005-2006 No. 74, 136 P.3d 237, 244
(Colo. 2006) (Coats, J., dissenting).
94 See, e.g., In re Application of Okla. Tpk. Auth. for Approval of not to Exceed $480,000
Okla. Tpk. Sys. Second Senior Lien Revenue Bonds, Series 2016, 2016 OK 124, ¶ 8, 389 P.3d
318, 320; Burns v. Cline, 2016 OK 99, ¶ 1, 382 P.3d 1048, 1049; Fent v. Fallin, 2013 OK 107,
¶ 1, 315 P.3d 1023, 1024; Douglas v. Cox Ret. Props., Inc., 2013 OK 37, ¶ 2, 302 P.3d 789, 791–
92; Thomas v. Henry, 2011 OK 53, ¶ 2, 260 P.3d 1251, 1253 (per curiam); Nova Health Sys. v.
Edmondson, 2010 OK 21, ¶ 1, 233 P.3d 380, 381; Fent v. State ex rel. Okla. Capitol
Improvement Auth., 2009 OK 15, ¶ 1, 214 P.3d 799, 800; In re Initiative Petition No. 382, State
Question No. 729, 2006 OK 45, ¶ 1, 142 P.3d 400, 402.
95 See Fent, 2009 OK 15, ¶¶ 1, 24, 214 P.3d at 800, 807.
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different projects96—both times without dissent. Although the
second decision sought to distinguish the first by finding the common
theme of turnpike construction and maintenance linked the multiple
projects,97 the tension between the decisions remains.
A. Germaneness
As the Oklahoma turnpike decision indicates, the question in many
single-subject cases is not the definition of “subject” per se, but
whether the different topics, sections, or parts of a bill are sufficiently
closely connected that they can be treated as dealing with a single
subject.98 As the Ohio Supreme Court put it, the rule “allows a
plurality of topics” even as it bars a “disunity of subjects.”99 Indeed,
most single-subject disputes involve laws that, as enacted, consist of
multiple provisions.100 Courts have developed a range of tests for
determining whether the multiple parts of a bill are sufficiently
related so that when combined they constitute but a single subject,
including whether they are “rationally related”101 whether there is a
“unifying principle,”102 “natural and logical connection,”103 or a
“common purpose or relationship . . . between the topics;”104 “whether
they have a nexus to a common purpose;”105 whether they “fairly
relate to the same subject”106 or “relate, directly or indirectly, to the
same general subject and have a mutual connection;”107 whether
there is a “common thread”108 or “filament”109 linking them to each

See In re Application of Okla. Tpk. Auth., 2016 OK 124, ¶ 8, 389 P.3d at 320.
See id. ¶¶ 10, 12, 389 P.3d at 321.
98 See In re Application of Okla. Tpk. Auth. for Approval of not to Exceed $480,000 Okla.
Tpk. Sys. Second Senior Lien Revenue Bonds, Series 2016, 2016 OK 124, ¶ 12, 389 P.3d 318,
321.
99 State ex rel. Hinkle v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Elections, 580 N.E.2d 767, 770 (Ohio 1991)
(citing Comtech Sys. v. Limbach, 570 N.E.2d 1089, 1093 (Ohio 1991)).
100 See, e.g., Wirtz v. Quinn, 2011 IL 111903, ¶ 5; 953 N.E. 899, 903; Arangold Corp. v.
Zehnder, 718 N.E.2d 191, 197 (Ill. 1999); Pennsylvanians Against Gambling Expansion Fund,
Inc. v. Commonwealth, 877 A.2d 383, 392 (Pa. 2005).
101 See State ex rel. Ohio Civil Serv. Emps. Ass’n v. State, 146 Ohio St. 3d 315, 2016-Ohio478, 56 N.E.3d 913, ¶ 33.
102 See McIntire v. Forbes, 909 P.2d 846, 856 (Or. 1996).
103 People v. Cervantes, 723 N.E.2d 265, 267 (Ill. 1999) (citing Arangold Corp., 718 N.E.2d
at 197; People v. Reedy, 708 N.E.2d 1114, 1117 (Ill. 1999); Johnson v. Edgar, 680 N.E.2d 1372,
1379 (Ill. 1997)).
104 Hoover v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs, 482 N.E.2d 575, 580 (Ohio 1985).
105 Commonwealth v. Neiman, 84 A.3d 603, 612 (Pa. 2013).
106 Westin Crown Plaza Hotel Co. v. King, 664 S.W.2d 2, 6 (Mo. 1984).
107 Ex parte Jones, 440 S.W.3d 628, 632 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (citing Lecroy v. Hanlon, 713
S.W.2d 335, 337 (Tex. 1986)).
108 Beagle v. Walden, 676 N.E.2d 506, 507 (Ohio 1997).
109 Blanch v. Suburban Hennepin Reg’l Park Dist., 449 N.W.2d 150, 155 (Minn. 1989).
96
97
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other, or—from the opposite perspective—whether they are “distinct
and incongruous”110 or “dissimilar and discordant.”111 The most
commonly used judicial standard is whether they are “germane” or
“reasonably germane” to each other or to some general subject.112
Of course, as other commentators have recognized, “reasonable
germaneness” is not much more precise or determinate than “subject”
itself.113 The body of law the courts have produced as they have
grappled with the question of whether the different parts of a bill are
germane to each other or to some overarching subject is not much
more consistent than the jurisprudence concerning permissible
subjects.114
Thus, courts have found sufficient germaneness in laws that
combine a tax on motor vehicle fuels with authorization of bonds to
finance highway construction;115 add an authorization of a park
district to acquire land to a bill making appropriations for state
government;116 combine an authorization of the privatization of
liquor sales with funding for public safety;117 combine provisions
dealing with asbestos abatement, leaking underground storage
tanks, and water well drilling under the rubric of “environmental
control;”118 combine local regulation of billboards with funding for the
state transportation department;119 add a program for the
privatization of child support enforcement to a bill dealing with
welfare reform;120 add an authorization for counties to hire private
accounting firms to audit their books to the state government finance
omnibus bill;121 include provisions regulating the sale of prisons to

Porten Sullivan Corp. v. State, 568 A.2d 1111, 1121 (Md. 1990).
Kan. Nat’l Educ. Ass’n v. State, 387 P.3d 795, 805 (Kan. 2017) (quoting Kan. Pub. Emps.
Ret. Sys. v. Reimer & Koger Assocs., Inc., 941 P.2d 1321, 1347 (Kan. 1997)).
112 See Unity Church v. State, 694 N.W.2d. 585, 593 (Minn. Ct. App. 2005) (citing Associated
Builders & Contractors v. Ventura, 610 N.W.2d 293, 300 (Minn. 2000)); see also Kastorf, supra
note 3, at 1660 (“The ‘reasonably germane’ test is the most common test for compliance with
the single subject rule.”).
113 See, e.g., Robert D. Cooter & Michael D. Gilbert, A Theory of Direct Democracy and the
Single Subject Rule, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 687, 710 (2010) (“‘Germaneness’ provides no clear
guidance to the correct level of abstraction.”).
114 See, e.g., People v. Cervantes, 723 N.E.2d 265, 271–72 (Ill. 1999); Wass v. Anderson, 252
N.W.2d 131, 135–36 (Minn. 1977); Cooter & Gilbert, supra note 113, at 710.
115 See Wass, 252 N.W.2d at 135–36.
116 See Blanc v. Suburban Hennepin Reg’l Park Dist., 449 N.W.2d 150, 152, 155 (Minn.
1989).
117 See Wash. Ass’n for Substance Abuse v. State, 278 P.3d 632, 635, 656–59 (Wash. 2012).
118 See Corvera Abatement Techs. v. Air Conservation Comm’n, 973 S.W.2d 851, 860, 862
(Mo. 1998).
119 See C.C. Dillon Co. v. City of Eureka, 12 S.W.3d 322, 329 (Mo. 2000).
120 See Md. Classified Emps. Ass’n v. State, 694 A.2d 937, 938, 944–45 (Md. 1997).
121 See Otto v. Wright Cty., 910 N.W.2d 446, 457 (Minn. 2018).
110
111
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private operators in the state budget bill;122 and combine funding for
emergency medical services with a prohibition on the use of tax
increment financing in flood plains (on the theory that the financing
restriction would reduce the need for emergency services).123
On the other hand, courts have rejected on single-subject grounds
measures that sought to combine: regulation of long-term care with
authorization of the state attorney general to enforce regulation of
advertising by nursing homes;124 multiple anti-crime and
neighborhood safety provisions with provisions regulating (including
but not limited to criminal punishments for fraud) private providers
of public welfare services;125 payment of prevailing wage
requirements for both publicly and non-publicly financed school
construction and remodeling projects added to an omnibus tax relief
bill;126 a ban on persons convicted of a felony from running for elected
office in the state with a general regulation of political subdivisions
including local elections;127 changes to a state’s public utilities
regulatory fund with changes in the public service commission’s rulemaking process;128 a provision relating to resident agents of
corporations and a provision governing directors of investment
companies;129 and changes to the state’s workers’ compensation
system with an exemption from the state’s child labor laws and
provision for an intentional workplace tort.130 There may be a
principle that explains the different findings of connection or
germaneness across the cases, but it is not easy to discern.
B. Judicial Deference
Most courts have declared that they will take a deferential
approach to the legislature, adopting a “liberal interpretation” of the

122 See State ex rel. Ohio Civ. Serv. Emps. Ass’n v. State, 146 Ohio St. 3d 315, 2016-Ohio478, 56 N.E.3d 913, ¶¶ 2, 19.
123 See City of St. Charles v. State, 165 S.W.3d 149, 151–52 (Mo. 2005).
124 See Mo. Health Care Ass’n v. Attorney Gen., 953 S.W.2d 617, 623 (Mo. 1997).
125 See People v. Cervantes, 723 N.E.2d 265, 271–72 (Ill. 1999).
126 See Associated Builders & Contractors v. Ventura, 610 N.W.2d 293, 295, 307 (Minn.
2000).
127 See Rizzo v. State, 189 S.W.3d 576, 581 (Mo. 2006); see also Hammerschmidt v. Boone
Cty. , 877 S.W.2d 98, 103 (Mo. 1994) (rejecting a bill that combined a provision allowing certain
counties to adopt, by election, a county constitution with a provision generally relating to local
elections); State ex rel. Hinkle v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Elections, 580 N.E.2d 767, 769, 770 (Ohio
1991) (rejecting combination of provisions dealing with judicial elections and local option
elections).
128 See Delmarva Power & Light Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 809 A.2d 640, 651 (Md. 2002).
129 See Migdal v. State, 747 A.2d 1225, 1232 (Md. 2000).
130 See State ex rel. Ohio AFL-CIO v. Voinovich, 631 N.E.2d 582, 586 (Ohio 1994).
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meaning of “subject” and of the degree of connectedness among a bill’s
parts necessary to satisfy the germaneness standard.131 Reviewing
the state’s case law, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court observed that
“[i]n more recent decisions, . . . Pennsylvania courts have become
extremely deferential toward the General Assembly in [singlesubject] challenges” and have upheld laws as long as “the court can
fashion a single, over-arching topic to loosely relate the various
subjects included in the statute under review.”132 High courts in
Alaska,133
Illinois,134
Kansas,135
Maryland,136
Missouri,137
138
139
Minnesota,
Ohio
and other states have similarly taken the
position that they will strike down laws on single-subject grounds
only if the violation is “clearly, plainly and palpably so,” “manifestly
gross and fraudulent,” or shown “beyond a reasonable doubt.”140
The case for such a liberal, deferential approach is clear. It
demonstrates respect for a coordinate branch of government.141 If
few, or no laws are struck down on single-subject grounds, it

131 See Wirtz v. Quinn, 2011 IL 111903, ¶ 14, 953 N.E.2d 899, 905; People v. Olender, 854
N.E.2d 593, 599 (Ill. 2005) (citing People v. Reedy, 708 N.E.2d 1114, 1117 (Ill. 1999)); Arangold
Corp. v. Zehnder, 718 N.E.2d 191, 198 (Ill. 1999) (citing Johnson v. Edgar, 680 N.E.2d 1372,
1379 (Ill. 1997)); Kan. Nat’l Educ. Ass’n v. State, 387 P.3d 795, 808–09 (Kan. 2017) (citing Kan.
One-Call Sys. v. State, 274 P.3d 625, 633 (Kan. 2012)); Md. Classified Emps. Ass’n v. State, 694
A.2d 937, 943 (Md. 1997) (quoting Whiting-Turner Contracting Co. v. Coupard, 499 A.2d 178,
189 (Md. 1985)); Johnson v. Harrison, 50 N.W. 923, 924 (Mo. 1891).
132 See City of Philadelphia v. Commonwealth, 838 A.2d 566, 587 (Pa. 2003).
133 See, e.g., Evans v. State, 56 P.3d 1046, 1069 (Alaska 2002) (“[O]nly a ‘substantial and
plain’ violation of the one subject rule will lead us to strike down legislation on this basis.”).
134 See Wirtz, 2011 IL 111903, ¶¶ 14, 15, 62, 953 N.E.2d at 905, 914 (citing Olender, 854
N.E.2d at 599; Arangold, 718 N.E.2d at 198) (“[W]e construe the word ‘subject’ liberally in favor
of upholding the legislation. . . . [L]egislation violates the single subject rule when it contains
unrelated provision that by no fair interpretation have any legitimate relation to the single
subject.”).
135 See Kan. Nat’l Educ. Ass’n, 387 P.3d at 808–09 (citing Kan. One-Call Sys., 274 P.3d at
633) (“[T]he underlying policy of liberally construing the one-subject rule . . . .”).
136 See Porten Sullivan Corp. v. State, 568 A.2d 1111, 1118 (Md. 1990) (quoting Coupard,
499 A.2d at 189) (“[T]he ‘general disposition of [this] Court has been to give the section a liberal
construction, so as not to interfere with or impede legislative action.’”) (alteration in original).
137 See C.C. Dillon Co. v. City of Eureka, 12 S.W.3d 322, 327 (Mo. 2000) (quoting
Hammerschmidt v. Boone Co., 877 S.W.2d 98, 102 (Mo. 1994)) (finding no violation of the single
subject rule unless the act clearly and undoubtedly violates the rule).
138 See Unity Church v. State, 694 N.W.2d. 585, 594 (Minn. Ct. App. 2005) (citing Defs. of
Wildlife v. Ventura, 632 N.W.2d 707, 712 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001)) (“[B]ecause of the liberal
deference given to the legislature, Minnesota courts have rarely invalidated laws for a lack of
germaneness.”).
139 See State ex rel. Ohio Civ. Serv. Emps. Ass’n v. State, 146 Ohio St. 3d 315, 2016-Ohio478, 56 N.E.3d 913, ¶ 16 (citing State ex rel. Ohio Acad. of Trial Lawyers v. Sheward, 715
N.E.2d 1062, 1100 (Ohio 1999)) (“To accord appropriate deference to the General Assembly’s
law-making function, we must liberally construe the term ‘subject’ for purposes of the rule.”).
140 See Dragich, supra note 20, at 105–06.
141 See id. at 127.
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minimizes the need for the court to articulate a clear and consistent
standard for determining the meaning of “subject” or “germaneness”
or to rationalize the different treatment of different cases.142 And it
avoids the extremely knotty question of what to do when a law is
determined to violate the rule — strike the whole law down; or sever
the section or sections not germane to the other provisions, strike
those down, and sustain the rest.143 On the other hand, judicial
deference, with the resulting expansive definitions of subject and
germaneness threaten to undermine the single-subject principle and
to render a provision of the state constitution a “dead letter.”144 If the
purpose of the single-subject requirement is to reform the operations
of the state legislature,145 it may be odd to leave enforcement of the
requirement to the legislature itself. Nor is it clear that enforcement
of the rule would be so disrespectful of the legislature. Like other
process reforms, the single-subject requirement does not limit the
objects of state legislation or the goals of state policy, but only the
form of the legislation used to achieve those ends. There would be no
restriction on the legislature enacting separately those measures it
could not enact together, and many findings of single-subject
violations have been followed by just such separate enactments.146
In any event, nearly all the courts that have declared themselves
committed to a deferential, liberal interpretation of “subject” have at
one time or another struck down laws on single-subject grounds.147
142 See Courtney Paige Odishaw, Note, Curbing Legislative Chaos: Executive Choice or
Congressional Responsibility?, 74 IOWA L. REV. 227, 242–44 (1988).
143 See State ex rel. Ohio Civ. Serv. Emps. Ass’n, 146 Ohio St. 3d 315, 2016-Ohio-478, 56
N.E.3d 913, at ¶ 22 (quoting State ex rel. Hinkle v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Elections, 580 N.E.2d
767, 770 (Ohio 1991)) (“[T]he appropriate remedy when a legislative act violates the one-subject
rule is generally to sever the offending portions of the act ‘to cure the defect and save the
portions’ of the act that do relate to a single subject”); State ex rel. Ohio AFL-CIO v. Voinovich,
631 N.E.2d 582, 587 (Ohio 1994) (ordering severance for violating the state constitution single
subject rule); Commonwealth v. Neiman, 84 A.3d 603, 615 (Pa. 2013) (“[T]he reality that
discerning the ‘main’ purpose of a piece of legislation becomes an untenable exercise in
conjecture when the legislation has metamorphosed during the legislative process to include a
panoply of additional and disparate subjects.”); Dragich, supra note 20, at 155–57; see also
Ruud, supra note 19, at 398–99 (discussing the difficulty of severability).
144 See Porten Sullivan Corp. v. State, 568 A.2d 1111, 1118 (Md. 1990).
145 See Dragich, supra note 20, at 114–15.
146 See, e.g., Socorro Adams Dooley, Comment, It’s Still a Peanut Butter Cookie: A Comment
on Douglas v. Cox Retirement Properties, Inc., 39 OKLA. CITY U.L. REV. 243, 262–63 (2014)
(following the Oklahoma Supreme Court’s invalidation of tort reform law on single-subject
grounds, governor called a special session of the legislature which passed twenty-three separate
bills which had been part of the invalid comprehensive measure). In response to a preemptive
measure invalidated on single-subject grounds in Cooperative Home Care, Inc. v. City of St.
Louis, 514 S.W.3d 571, 577 (Mo. 2017), Missouri adopted a similar preemptive measure by
passing a law preempting local minimum wage laws. See MO. REV. STAT. § 290.528 (2018).
147 See, e.g., People v. Cervantes, 723 N.E.2d 265, 270 (Ill. 1999); People v. Reedy, 708 N.E.2d
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“There must be limits”148—”[t]here comes a point”149—the courts
complain, but the rule of liberal-interpretation-up-to-a-point fails to
provide a very predictable or neutral principle, and contributes to
concerns that application of the rule is driven by the policy or political
views of the judges.150
C. Some Recent Cases
A brief review of recent cases—all from the current decade—from
a half-dozen state supreme courts around the country may give a
fuller sense of the difficulty inherent in applying the rule. Although
some readers—and this author—may conclude that in some of the
cases the “single-subject” question was pretty easy and that the court
got it right,151 in others the issue was far more difficult and the
wisdom of the decision far more debatable.
To begin, there are at least two cases involving what seem to be
easy violations of the rule. In 2016, in Leach v. Commonwealth, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court struck down a law that consisted of
four substantive sections addressing: trespass for the purpose of
unlawfully taking secondary metal152 from a premises; theft of
secondary metal as an independent offense; state police disclosure of
records; and standing for individuals or organizations to challenge

1114, 1119 (Ill. 1999); Johnson v. Edgar, 680 N.E.2d 1372, 1380 (Ill. 1997)); Delmarva Power &
Light Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 809 A.2d 640, 651–52 (Md. 2002); Migdal v. State, 747 A.2d
1225, 1232 (Md. 2000); Porten Sullivan, 568 A.2d at 1112; Unity Church v. State, 694 N.W.2d.
585, 588, 593 (Minn. Ct. App. 2005); Coop. Home Care, 514 S.W.3d at 575–76; Mo. Roundtable
for Life, Inc. v. State, 396 S.W.3d 348, 350 (Mo. 2013) (en banc) (per curiam); State ex rel. Ohio
Acad. of Trial Lawyers v. Sheward, 715 N.E.2d 1062, 1100 (Ohio 1999); Simmons-Harris v.
Goff, 711 N.E.2d 203, 207 (Ohio 1999); Leach v. Commonwealth, 141 A.3d 426, 435 (Pa. 2016);
Neiman, 84 A.3d at 605; Pa. State Ass’n of Jury Comm’rs v. Commonwealth, 64 A.3d 611, 618–
19 (Pa. 2013); City of Philadelphia v. Commonwealth, 838 A.2d 566, 593 (Pa. 2003);.
148 City of Philadelphia, 838 A.2d at 588 (citing Payne v. Sch. Dist. of Borough of
Coudersport, 31 A. 1072, 1074 (Pa. 1895)).
149 Sheward, 715 N.E.2d at 1101.
150 See Michael D. Gilbert, Does Law Matter? Theory and Evidence from Single-Subject
Adjudication, 40 J. LEG. STUD. 333, 355 (2011) (finding that judicial ideology had a “consistent,
statistically significant relationship with judges’ votes” particularly in cases implicating
“fundamental values”); John G. Matsusaka & Richard L. Hasen, Aggressive Enforcement of the
Single Subject Rule, 9 ELECTION L.J. 399, 400 (2010); see also Hoffer, supra note 49, at 568–69
(asserting that the Ohio Supreme Court’s Sheward decision was “as much a political shake-up
as a judicial pronouncement”). But see Downey et al., supra note 3, at 596.
151 Professor
Gilbert found that student coders frequently agreed with judges’
categorizations of the number of subjects in a measure. See Gilbert, supra note 150, at 342–43,
346, 352.
152 See Leach v. Commonwealth, 141 A.3d 426, 428, 435 (Pa. 2016). “Secondary metal” refers
to metal such as copper and aluminum or wire and cable used by utilities and transportation
agencies. Id. at 427.
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local gun regulations.153 The provisions could be linked only if, as the
legislative leaders contended, they addressed “the subject of
amending the Crimes Code.”154 Such a “subject” would pass
constitutional muster only at a very high level of abstraction, which
conceivably might have sufficed if the law was a comprehensive
revision of the criminal code, which it wasn’t.155 Similarly, in 2017,
the Missouri Supreme Court held in Cooperative Home Care, Inc. v.
City of St. Louis that a law combining “the establishment, proper
governance, and operation of community improvement districts” with
a prohibition on municipalities setting a minimum wage higher than
that set by the state violated Missouri’s single-subject rule.156 It’s not
clear what “single subject” could have held these two parts together
since the party defending the local minimum wage ban argued only
that collateral estoppel from an earlier decision barred the city from
raising the statute’s invalidity as a defense,157 and the court simply
declared without analysis that the minimum wage preemption was
“not connected to, related to, or germane to” the regulation of
community improvement districts.158
On the other hand, two cases from Kansas and Utah dealing with
laws broadly addressing education issues reached the seemingly
reasonable conclusion that they dealt with a single subject:
education.159 The Utah law addressed a number of education issues
ranging from the state’s school aid formula, to the funding of charter
schools, requirements regarding educational materials, teacher
salaries, a number of pilot programs, and appropriations for the pilot
programs, pupil transportation, classroom supplies, and arts
education.160 Not only could many of these measures have been
enacted as separate laws, but in fact the bill was an amalgamation of
what had originally been fourteen separate bills.161 It is possible that
some legislators supported some of these measures and not others
and, as a result, had to cast votes inconsistent with their topic-bytopic preferences.162 Nonetheless, if the single-subject rule is to

Id. at 428.
See id. at 431.
155 See id. at 433–34.
156 Coop. Home Care, Inc. v. City of St. Louis, 514 S.W.3d 571, 577, 580 (Mo. 2017).
157 See id. at 581.
158 See id. at 580–81.
159 See Kan. Nat’l Educ. Ass’n v. State, 387 P.3d 795, 799 (Kan. 2017); Gregory v. Shurtleff,
2013 UT 18, ¶ 42, 299 P.3d 1098, 1113.
160 See Gregory, 2013 UT 18, app., 299 P.3d at 1118.
161 See id. ¶ 49, 299 P.3d at 1115.
162 See id. ¶ 44, 299 P.3d at 1114.
153
154

THE SINGLE SUBJECT RULE

2018/2019]

9/18/2019 6:49 PM

The Single-Subject Rule

1647

permit comprehensive approaches to legislative subjects, this would
appear to be such a case. The Kansas education case, Kansas
National Education Association v. State, arguably pushes the
envelope a bit more. Adopted in response to a state supreme court
decision invalidating portions of the state’s public school finance
laws, the challenged law “had a sweeping scope” including the
appropriation of new state school aid, the cancellation of prior
appropriations for non-education purposes to fund the new school aid,
“substantive and technical changes to the state’s public school
financing statutes,” appropriations and transfer of land to state
universities, a tax credit for businesses that contribute to
organizations that provide scholarships to low-income students,
changes to high school teacher licensing requirements, “performancebased incentives for GED and career education matriculation and
enrollment at state universities,” and most controversially, changes
to the Teacher Due Process Act to remove protections from many
elementary and secondary public school teachers concerning the
termination or nonrenewal of their contracts.163 As the Court
acknowledged, the law contained multiple topics affecting the
operations of public schools, benefits for students, state universities,
and touched many different government agencies.164 As the lawsuit
by the NEA suggests, there could easily have been opposition to the
elimination of teacher due process protections from legislators who
favor increased funding for schools.165 Yet, applying the “policy of
liberally construing the one-subject rule”166 all the measures seemed
germane to education and “the term ‘education’ is not so broad that
it fails to limit the area in which the legislature may operate.”167
Turning to some arguably closer cases, in Wirtz v. Quinn, the
Illinois Supreme Court sustained a complex, multi-part law intended
to authorize and fund a massive capital projects program.168 Its
provisions included, inter alia, raising and reallocating the proceeds
of a range of different taxes and fees; authorizing a pilot program
allowing individuals to purchase state lottery tickets on the internet,
reallocating the proceeds of the state lottery, and directing a named
163 See Kan. Nat’l Educ. Ass’n, 387 P.3d at 798, 804 (citing Gannon v. State, 319 P.3d 1196,
1204 (Kan. 2014)).
164 See Kan. Nat’l Educ. Ass’n, 387 P.3d at 808–09.
165 See id. at 798, 804; see also Kan. Nat’l Educ. Ass’n v. Kansas, No. 2014-CV-789, 2015 WL
13066334, at *11 (D. Kan. June 4, 2015) (finding that legislature opted to include the teacher
due process component to capture votes in favor of funding).
166 Kan. Nat’l Educ. Ass’n, 387 P.3d at 808.
167 Id. at 809.
168 See Wirtz v. Quinn, 2011 IL 111903, ¶ 57, 953 N.E.2d 899, 913.
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state university to conduct a study of the effects on Illinois families
of purchasing lottery tickets; increasing the weight limits for motor
vehicles and loads, and authorizing, regulating, and taxing video
gaming.169 On its face this would seem to include multiple subjects.
But the Illinois court rationalized that they were all related to
financing the capital program.170 The authorization of video gaming
and of the on-line purchase of lottery tickets was intended to generate
funds for the capital program, and the study of the impact of the
lottery on families was a response to the expansion of the lottery
program.171 The increased weight and load limits for motor vehicles
was an offset to the increase in motor vehicle fees and fines for
overweight vehicles—which was one of the many sources of funds for
the capital program.172 The court made a plausible case that it all
hung together, although other commentators have sharply
disagreed.173 Less persuasive—to this author, at least—are two other
state court decisions that found that substantive policy provisions
tucked into budget bills satisfied the single-subject requirement. In
2016 in State ex rel. Ohio Civil Service Employees Ass’n v. State, the
Ohio Supreme Court held that the inclusion in the biennial budget
bill of provisions changing the law governing the terms for the
privatizing of prison operations and authorizing the operation,
management, and sale of five prison facilities did not violate the
single-subject rule.174 The privatization of prison operations and the
sale of prison facilities would save costs and generate revenue for the
state and thus fell within the subject of “budgeting for the operation
of the state government.”175 But on that theory, of course, any law
with state fiscal implications could be considered as part of the
subject of budgeting for the operation of state government – certainly,

See id. ¶¶ 19, 21–22, 25, 29, 953 N.E.2d at 905–07.
See id. ¶ 57, 953 N.E.2d at 913.
171 See id. ¶¶ 34, 50, 57, 953 N.E.2d at 908, 911, 913.
172 See id. ¶ 34, 953 N.E.2d at 908.
173 See, e.g., Eric Block, Broke: The Pocketbook of Illinois and the Single Subject Rule After
Wirtz v. Quinn, 953 NE.2d 899 (Ill. 2011), 37 S. ILL. L.J. 237, 246 (2012) (“The Illinois Supreme
Court wrongly decided Wirtz v. Quinn, and in doing so, the court increased uncertainty in an
already uncertain area of law, undermined the principles underlying the single subject
rule . . . .”); see also Giuliano Apadula, State Constitutional Law—Single Subject Rule—The
Illinois Supreme Court Adopts an Irrebuttable Presumption of Constitutionality for Legislation
Challenged by the Single Subject Rule. Wirtz v. Quinn, 953 N.E.2d 899 (Ill. 2011), 43 RUTGERS
L.J. 617, 634 (2013) (“[T]he court retreated from the well-settled single subject jurisprudence
by applying the single subject rule with a level of deference sufficient to render the single
subject rule a dead letter.”).
174 See State ex rel. Ohio Civ. Serv. Emps.’ Ass’n v. State 146 Ohio St. 3d 315, 2016-Ohio478, 56 N.E.3d 913, ¶¶ 2, 64.
175 Id. ¶ 33.
169
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an enormous subject. Similarly, in Otto v. Wright County, the
Minnesota Supreme Court in 2018 determined that including in the
State Government Omnibus Finance Act a provision enabling
counties to choose to have their required annual audit performed by
a CPA firm instead of by the state auditor did not violate the singlesubject rule because that was “clearly germane to the subject of state
government operations,” which was the subject of the Act.176
Although the county audit option could potentially reduce the
workload of the state auditor, the amendment seems to be really far
more about the powers and duties of counties than the operations of
state government.177
Finally, there is the divided Oklahoma Supreme Court’s decision
in Douglas v. Retirement Properties, Inc., invalidating that state’s
Comprehensive Lawsuit Reform Act.178 The majority stressed that
the law contained ninety sections that included multiple
amendments to the civil procedure code plus many new acts dealing
with, inter alia emergency volunteer health practitioners, asbestos
and silica claims, mandatory seat belt use, livestock activities
liability, firearm manufacturers liability, and school discipline.179
Without much analysis180 the majority simply concluded that the
multiple provisions were “unrelated” to each other and that
“[m]any . . . have nothing in common.”181 By contrast, the two
dissenters emphasized there was a common theme: “the legislature
and the public understood the common themes and purposes
embodied in the legislation; it was tort reform.”182 They also pointed
out the legislature had previously enacted, without successful singlesubject objection, such broad measures as the ten-article and 368section Uniform Commercial Code, and a 78-section Evidence Code,
and that the majority’s treatment of the tort reform law would create
“substantial difficulty” for the legislature to pass “comprehensive
legislation including any uniform codes that are generally adopted
Otto v. Wright City, 910 N.W.2d 446, 457 (Minn. 2018).
See id. at 454; cf. Rizzo v. State, 189 S.W.3d 576, 580–81 (Mo. 2006) (invalidating a
provision of a law dealing primarily with local governments that also applied to state elections).
178 See Douglas v. Cox Ret. Props., Inc., 2013 OK 37, ¶ 12, 302 P.3d 789, 794.
179 See id. ¶¶ 7–9, 302 P.3d at 793.
180 The majority devoted five paragraphs to the discussion of the law and the application of
the single-subject rule to it, including one that focused solely on whether severance rather than
complete invalidation was a possible remedy. See id. ¶¶ 7–11, 302 P.3d at 793–94 (citing
Campbell v. White, 856 P.2d 255, 258 (Okla. 1993)).
181 See Douglas, 2013 OK 37, ¶¶ 7, 10, 302 P.3d at 793; see also Dooley, supra note 146, at
261 (providing a critical assessment of the decision and an argument that it is inconsistent with
Oklahoma single-subject precedents).
182 See Douglas, 2013 OK 37, ¶ 4, 302 P.3d at 802 (Winchester, J., dissenting).
176
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among the states.”183 In their view, the “majority opinion gives little
guidance” for distinguishing between impermissibly sweeping multipart laws and acceptable comprehensive ones.184
A striking feature of the dueling opinions in Douglas was the
Oklahoma justices’ focus on the anti-logrolling purpose often invoked
to explain and justify the single-subject rule.185 The majority
expressly framed its analysis in light the rule’s anti-logrolling
purpose.186 Without citing any specific instances of logrolling in the
legislative history, the majority concluded that in a bill with so many
different sections and topics, legislators were inevitably “faced with
an all-or-nothing choice” which would require them to vote for
provisions they did not want “to ensure the passage of favorable
legislation.”187 The dissent, however, saw the range of multiple
provisions in the bill as evidence of legislative compromise.188 In any
complex measure, “[i]t is likely that some of the legislators who voted
in favor of the bill compromised to secure its passage.”189 But in the
dissent’s view that is a feature and not a bug as “[l]egislation requires
some compromise.”190
The division in Douglas points to the possibility of anti-logrolling
and the other purposes behind the single-subject rule in providing a
more workable standard than the text of the rule itself for applying
the rule, as well as the difficulties in doing so.191 That is the focus of
the next Part.
IV. FROM TEXT TO PURPOSE: ANTI-LOGROLLING AND ANTI-RIDERS
AS STANDARDS FOR ENFORCEMENT
Like the Oklahoma judges in Douglas, many courts and
commentators have sought to resolve the intractable question of how
to define “subject” by turning to the purposes long seen as explaining
and justifying the single-subject rule: prevention of logrolling and
See id. ¶¶ 7–8, 302 P.3d at 802–03.
See id. ¶ 3, 302 P.3d at 802.
185 See id., ¶¶ 4, 12, 302 P.3d at 792–94 (majority opinion) (citing Nova Health Sys. v.
Edmonson, 2010 OK 21, ¶ 2, 33 P.3d 380, 381 (2010)).
186 See Douglas, 2013 OK 37, ¶ 4, 302 P.3d at 792 (citing Nova Health Sys., 2010 OK 21, ¶ 2,
233 P.3d at 381).
187 See Douglas, 2013 OK 37, ¶ 10, 302 P.3d at 793 (citing Campbell v. White, 856 P.2d 255,
260 (Okla. 1993)).
188 See Douglas, 2013 OK 37, ¶ 9, 302 P.3d at 803 (Winchester, J., dissenting).
189 See id. ¶ 7, 302 P.3d at 803.
190 See id. ¶ 9, 302 P.3d at 803.
191 See id. ¶ 4, 302 P.3d at 792 (majority opinion); id. ¶ 13, 18, 302 P.3d at 799–801 (Kauger,
J., concurring specially) (citing Nova Health Sys., 2010 OK 21, ¶ 2, 233 P.3d at 381); Douglas,
2013 OK 37, ¶ 1, 302 P.3d at 801 (Winchester, J., dissenting).
183
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riders, and more generally protection of the legislative process from
improper manipulations.192 Logrolling, in particular, has long been
condemned. Indeed, “[i]n the United States, at least, . . . this word
has always had pejorative connotations.”193 By definition, an act put
together by logrolling consists of measures which, considered
individually, lacked majority support.194 Hence, its enactment is
often seen as inconsistent with majority rule. Logrolling has been
particularly criticized for facilitating the passage of wasteful
“Christmas tree” bills and pork-barrel legislation, that is, laws that
provide concentrated benefits—typically, subsidies; tax breaks;
restrictive licensing requirements; tariffs; and roads, harbors and
other highly targeted infrastructure investments—to a small number
of interests but impose broader costs on consumers and taxpayers.195
The notorious Smoot-Hawley Tariff of 1930 is often cited as an
example of how logrolling enables the coalition backing the law to win
benefits for the special interest groups promoting the tariff, at a cost
to the nation as a whole.196 Some courts, like the Oklahoma Supreme
Court and the Maryland Court of Appeals, have also emphasized the
way in which such a logroll coerces legislators to vote for provisions
they do not actually support or against a provision they would
otherwise support because it has been combined with measures they
oppose.197
192 See Wirtz v. Quinn, 2011 IL 111903, ¶¶ 13–14, 953 N.E.2d 899, 904 (quoting Johnson v.
Edgar, 680 N.E.2d 1372, 1379 (Ill. 1997)) (first citing People v. Olender, 854 N.E.2d 593, 599
(Ill. 2005); then citing People v. Wooters, 722 N.E.2d 1102, 1113 (Ill. 1999); and then citing
Arangold Corp. v. Zehnder, 718 N.E.2d 191, 197 (Ill. 1999)); Rizzo v. State, 189 S.W.3d 576,
578–79 (Mo. 2006) (citing Hammerschmidt v. Boone City, 877 S.W.2d 98, 101 (Mo. 1994));
Simmons-Harris v. Goff, 711 N.E.2d 203, 214 (Ohio 1999) (quoting State ex rel. Dix v. Celeste,
464 N.E.2d 153, 157 (Ohio 1984) (“[Logrolling] was the very evil the one-subject rule was
designed to prevent.”)); Commonwealth v. Neiman, 84 A.3d 603, 611–12 (Pa. 2013) (quoting
City of Philadelphia v. Comm., 838 A.2d 566, 586 (Pa. 2003)) (citing Hosp. & Healthsystem
Ass’n v. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare, 888 A.2d 601, 608 (Pa. 2005)); Denning & Smith, The Truth-inLegislation Amendment, supra note 1, at 968; Hoffer, supra note 39, at 558–59; Schuck, supra
note 52, at 901 (“Scholars point to the prevention of ‘logrolling’ as the primary and generally
recognized purpose for the single-subject clause.”).
193 William H. Riker & Steven J. Brams, The Paradox of Vote Trading, 67 AM. POL. SCI. REV.
1235, 1235 (1973).
194 See Gilbert, supra note 2, at 808 n.29.
195 See, e.g., DENNIS C. MUELLER, P UBLIC CHOICE 51 (1979) (“[T]he examples they cite of
tariff bills, tax loop-holes, and pork barrel public works, are all illustrations of bills for which a
minority benefits, largely from the redistributive aspects of the bill, and the accumulative losses
of the majority can be expected to be large.”).
196 See, for example, Riker & Brams, supra note 193, at 1235, citing the classic study by E.E.
SCHATTSCHNEIDER, POLITICS, PRESSURES AND THE TARIFF (1935).
197 See, e.g., Porten Sullivan Corp. v. State, 568 A.2d 1111, 1121–22 (Md. 1990); Thomas v.
Henry, 2011 OK 53, ¶ 26, 260 P.3d 1251, 1260 (Okla. 2011) (citing In re Initiative Petition No.
382, 2006 OK 45, ¶ 9, 142 P.3d 400, 405) (“The question is not how similar two provisions in a
proposed law are, but whether it appears either that the proposal is misleading or that the
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An early application of the single-subject rule by the Michigan
Supreme Court to strike down an act that appropriated state funds
for the improvement of three different state roads is a classic example
of the anti-logrolling philosophy at work.198 As Chief Justice Thomas
Cooley explained, the roads were
distinct objects of legislation, which might, with entire
propriety, have been provided for by separate acts, and
indeed, ought to have been, in view of the care which is taken
by the Constitution to compel each distinct object of legislation
to be considered separately. These objects have certainly no
necessary connection, and being grouped together in one bill,
legislators are not only preclude[d] from expressing by their
votes their opinion upon each separately; but they are so
united, as to invite a combination of interests among the
friends of each, in order to secure the success of all, when,
perhaps, neither could be passed separately. The evils of that
species of omnibus legislation which the constitution designed
to prohibit, are all invited by acts thus framed.199
Despite this longstanding hostility to legislation by logrolling,
modern scholarship has recognized that logrolling—or, less
pejoratively, vote-trading—may actually be socially desirable
because it recognizes that legislators have different intensities of
preference for different measures.200 A proposal may enjoy only
minority support not so much because the majority is actively hostile
to it but rather because the majority is largely indifferent or only
weakly opposed.201 Logrolling allows legislators to obtain passage of
the measures they more strongly support at the modest price of
voting for measures they are apathetic about or only mildly oppose.202
As a result, logrolling can make more legislators better off. To the
extent legislators accurately represent the interests of their
constituents, logrolling can enhance the overall well-being of the

provisions in the proposal are so unrelated that many of those voting on the law would be faced
with an unpalatable all-or-nothing choice.”).
198 See People ex rel. Estes v. Denahy, 20 Mich. 349, 352 (1870).
199 Id. at 351–52 (citing People ex rel. Drake v. Mahaney, 13 Mich. 481, 495 (1865); Davis v.
Bank of Fulton, 31 Geo., 69, 71 (1860); State ex rel. Weir v. Cty. Judge, 2 Iowa 280, 282 (1855)).
200 See Hardy Lee Wieting, Jr., Problems in Majority Rule and the Logrolling Solution, 76
ETHICS 85, 87–88 (1966).
201 See id. at 88.
202 See id.
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community.203 Moreover, logrolling may be particularly beneficial to
certain legislative groups, particularly weaker parties or
representatives of minority ethnic groups, that ordinarily lack the
votes to get the measures they care most about passed.204 By being
able to make vote-trading deals with some members of the majority,
there is at least some prospect they can advance some items of their
legislative agenda.205 Moreover, as some commentators have noted,
logrolling need not involve only pork-barrel legislation but may
embrace “what are truly pure public goods, e.g.[,] defense, education
and the environment.”206
To be sure, there is no guarantee that logrolling will be welfareenhancing. The ability of a legislative minority to advance its goals
through logrolling will depend on the skills, information, and
resources of the legislators.207 And the majority put together by
logrolling might still impose costs on the community as a whole that
are greater than the benefits to the logrolling coalition. But it is fair
to say that there is no reason to assume that majorities put together
by logrolling categorically impose net social costs or that they are
more net costly than majorities composed of a single group.208 It is
even more unlikely that courts will be able to tell the difference.209
Of course, even if the prejudice against logrolling is mistaken, that
alone might not matter for challenging the role of a concern about
logrolling in applying the single-subject rule. The real difficulty is
distinguishing improper logrolling from the deal-making and
compromises that are “pervasive” in collective bodies and “normally
characteristic of representative assemblies.”210 Such deal-making is
often a critical means for contending groups to compromise their
differences and reach a collective decision.211 Although the Illinois
Supreme Court once asserted “there is a difference between
203 See Edward J. McCaffery, The Holy Grail of Tax Simplification, 1990 WIS. L. REV. 1267,
1301 (1990).
204 See Pamela S. Karlan, Maps and Misreadings: The Role of Geographic Compactness in
Racial Vote Dilution, 24 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 173, 217 (1989).
205 See id.
206 See MUELLER, supra note 195, at 51–52.
207 See Wieting, supra note 200, at 93.
208 See, e.g., Riker & Brams, supra note 193, at 1246.
209 See, e.g., Kastorf, supra note 3, at 1665 (“Courts have no principled means of
distinguishing between socially beneficial and harmful coalition logrolling.”).
210 See JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT (1962),
reprinted in 3 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF JAMES M. BUCHANAN 135 (1999); cf. Frank H.
Easterbrook, Statutes’ Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533, 548 (1983) (“[L]ogrolling [is an]
accepted part[] of the legislative process.”).
211 See Kastorf, supra note 3, at 1647 (“Absent [logrolling], legislatures may not have the
necessary lubrication to overcome collective action problems.”).
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impermissible logrolling and the normal compromise which is
inherent in the legislative process,”212 it is not clear that’s correct.
Even a close review of the legislative history behind a bill213 may not
help as the question is less one of fact and more of interpretation and
acceptance of legislative practices.
As the Utah Supreme Court explained, “the line between forbidden
‘logrolling’ and mere ‘horse-trading’ may be a fine one.”214 The
Minnesota Court of Appeals went further in defending a challenged
bill against the claim that it was the result of impermissible
logrolling:
If the historical nature of legislation was such that every
single provision of a larger bill had to be able to pass both
houses of the legislature and obtain the governor’s signature
on its own merits, little if any legislation would ever be signed
into law. . . .
The practice of bundling controversial, volatile provisions
with germane and less-controversial laws is not impermissible
logrolling. Rather, it is the nature of the democratic
process . . . . [T]he negotiations and the constant give and
take
are
historical,
purely
legal,
and
purely
215
permissible . . . .
Indeed, courts have defended the “liberal” approach to interpreting
the single-subject rule as essential “to accommodate a significant
range and degree of political compromise that necessarily attends the
legislative process in a healthy, robust democracy.”216
The concern that bills that result from logrolling somehow coerce
legislators into voting against their preferences seems even weaker
than the claim that bills composed of provisions that might not have
passed on their own violates proper legislative norms.217
Compromise necessarily involves votes at odds with one’s ideal
position.218 As Professor Dan Lowenstein crisply put it: “Most choices
212 Wirtz v. Quinn, 2011 IL 111903, ¶ 48, 953 N.E.2d 899, 911 (citing Defs. of Wildlife v.
Ventura, 632 N.W.2d 707, 713–15 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001)).
213 The Wirtz court engaged in such a close review. See Wirtz, 2011 IL 111903, ¶¶ 39, 42–
43, 47, 953 N.E.2d at 909–911.
214 Gregory v. Shurtleff, 2013 UT 18, ¶ 51 n.27, 299 P.3d 1098, 1116 n.27.
215 Defs. of Wildlife, 632 N.W.2d at 714–15.
216 Md. Classified Emp. Ass’n v. State, 694 A.2d 937, 943 (Md. 1997).
217 See Gilbert, supra note 3, at 837.
218 See Lowenstein, supra note 14, at 958; Paul Kane, The Bill to Avert a Shutdown has Few
Eager
to
Claim
Parentage,
WASH.
POST
(Feb.
13,
2019),
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in life involve trade-offs.”219 Or as one member of Congress noted in
early February 2019 in explaining his vote for the bill that prevented
the recurrence of a second partial government shutdown, “When you
strike a deal, you get some things you want and you get some things
that you don’t like.”220
In theory, the case against riders may be stronger than the case
against logrolling. By definition, a rider is attached to a bill that
already enjoys majority support so that its backers should not have
had to vote for the rider in order to get their measure enacted.221
Michael Gilbert speculates that riders are more likely to result from
the ability of powerful individual legislators to manipulate rules and
procedures to get their particular proposals attached to a popular bill
and to block efforts to strip the rider out.222 In his view, riders are
always anti-majoritarian and, by definition, leave a majority of
legislators worse off as they would have preferred to vote for the bill
in question without the rider.223 He would reframe the single-subject
rule exclusively around the prevention of riders.224 Yet, in practice,
it may be difficult to distinguish a rider from a logroll. As the earliest
study of the single-subject rule found, determining whether a
provision is a rider is a “troublesome question.”225 Before enactment,
a bill’s proponents may be unsure whether the measure actually
enjoys majority support or is, instead, a few votes short of passage
and so is willing to accept an amendment that brings along a few
more votes.226 Is such a provision a logroll or a rider?227 Assessing
the provisions of an act after enactment, a court trying to distinguish
a logroll from a rider “would have to make unseemly and possibly
difficult judgments about the relative popularity of various provisions

https://www.washingtonpost.com/powerpost/the-bill-to-avoid-a-shutdown-has-few-eager-toclaim-parentage/2019/02/13/b3f61658-2fd6-11e9-86ab5d02109aeb01_story.html?utm_term=.4b937ec91c2b.
219 Lowenstein, supra note 14, at 958.
220 Kane, supra note 218.
221 See Gilbert, supra note 3, at 836.
222 See id. at 837.
223 See id. at 840; see also Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, The Jurisprudence of Public
Choice, 65 TEX. L. REV. 873, 923 (1987) (“Enforcement of the [single-subject] rule is particularly
appropriate when substantive riders have been attached to appropriations legislation”).
224 See Gilbert, supra note 3, at 809.
225 Ruud, supra note 19, at 400.
226 See Kastorf, supra note 3, at 1646.
227 See Dragich, supra note 20, at 161; Kastorf, supra note 3, at 1646; see also Richard
Briffault, The Item Veto in State Courts, 66 TEMP. L. REV. 1171, 1190 (1993) (considering the
difficulties courts have distinguishing between improper riders and acceptable conditions in
item veto cases).
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and the motivations of the sponsors.”228 Indeed, a close assessment
of Illinois’s Wirtz decision concluded that “the attempt to distinguish
between the two [logrolling and riders] may be futile.”229 The fact
that a provision, subsequently folded into a bigger bill, did not pass
on its own does not make it a rider.230 And even critics of riders
recognize that, like logrolls, they can be socially beneficial and make
net contributions to social well-being.231
Several judges taking a legislative-process-focused approach to the
single-subject rule have emphasized that the troublesome sections of
a bill – whether logroll or rider – were added at the “last minute” or
the “eleventh hour.”232 This underscores the single-subject rule’s
purposes of making sure that legislators are able to understand and
deliberate what they are voting on and that the legislative process is
sufficiently transparent so that the broader public can keep track of
legislative action.233 This emphasis on surprising late in the process
additions also implies some kind of legislative chicanery that would
support a judicial decision to strike down a measure. However, many
state legislatures operate under legal requirements of time-limited
legislative sessions.234 Some of these are as short as twenty to thirty
legislative days or sixty to ninety calendar days;235 in four states, the
legislature meets only for a limited number of days every other
year.236 Frequent amendments to pending legislation are surely a

228 Lowenstein, supra note 16, at 963; cf. Dragich, supra note 20, at 161–62 (analyzing two
Missouri single-subject cases and finding it difficult to decide whether the laws at issue
involved logrolls or riders).
229 Block, supra note 173, at 250.
230 See Ex parte Jones, 440 S.W.3d 628, 634 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014); Gregory v. Shurtleff,
2013 UT 18, ¶ 42, 299 P.3d 1098, 1113; cf. Defs. of Wildlife v. Ventura, 632 N.W.2d 707, 714
(Minn. Ct. App. 2001) (“[T]he fact that a controversial bill could not pass as a stand-alone bill,
while not irrelevant, is not conclusive proof of impermissible logrolling.”).
231 See Gilbert, supra note 3, at 839.
232 See Delmarva Power & Light Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm., 809 A.2d 640, 645–46 (Md. 2002);
Porten Sullivan Corp. v. State, 568 A.2d 1111, 1114–15 (Md. 1990); State ex rel. Ohio AFL-CIO
v. Voinovich, 631 N.E.2d 582, 601 (Ohio 1994) (Sweeney, J., dissenting in part and concurring
in part); Spahn v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 977 A.2d 1132, 1146 (Pa. 2009); Leach v.
Commonwealth, 118 A.3d 1271, 1279 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2015), aff’d, 141 A.3d 426, 430 (Pa.
2016).
233 See e.g., Ruud, supra note 19, at 391.
234 See Legislative Session Length, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (Dec. 2, 2010),
http://www.ncsl.org/research/about-state-legislatures/legislative-session-length.aspx (noting
that thirty-nine state legislatures are under state constitutional, statutory, or other restrictions
on the length of the legislative session).
235 Id.
236 See Annual vs. Biennial Legislative Sessions, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (Oct. 19,
2011),
http://www.ncsl.org/research/about-state-legislatures/annual-vs-biennial-legislativesessions.aspx.
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part of the legislative process to begin with.237 But tight session
limits put a lot of pressure to get the legislative business done in a
very short period and make it even more likely that there will be a
rush of amendments, combinations of previously separate measures
into bigger bills, and a surge of deal-making as the end of the
legislative session approaches.238 From the perspective of an
idealized, orderly and deliberative legislative process, this is surely
unfortunate. But, as one Ohio Supreme Court justice observed,
however “distasteful” and “ugly” the process may be, that does not
make it unconstitutional.239
It is difficult – probably impossible – to quarrel with the goals of
improved deliberation, transparency, and accountability. The real
issues are whether attention to those concerns, and the logrolls and
riders said to violate them, helps determine what is a “subject” and
when is the single-subject rule violated. There can be logrolls and
riders within a single subject, and omnibus or multi-part bills which
are put together for convenience or for the comprehensive treatment
of a subject.240 Indeed, in at least some circumstances, legislative
deliberation, effective law-making, transparency and public
accountability may be better served by multi-part bills that
comprehensively address a complex or multifaceted problem241 than
by narrower measures that address the issues piecemeal. Improper
manipulations of the legislative process – if they can be judicially
identified – may be evidence that a new law goes beyond a single
subject, but it is not clear that even a close review of the legislative
process can resolve the meaning of “subject.”

237 See, e.g., Pennsylvanians Against Gambling Expansion Fund, Inc. v. Commonwealth, 877
A.2d 383, 395 (Pa. 2005)
238 See NAT’L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES, BILLS AND BILL PROCESSING 3-1 (1996),
http://www.ncsl.org/documents/legismgt/ILP/96Tab3Pt1.pdf.
239 Beagle v. Walden, 676 N.E.2d 506, 510 (Ohio 1997) (Pfeifer, J., concurring in part).
240 See Gilbert, supra note 3, at 830; Eric S. Fish, Severability as Conditionality, 64 EMORY
L.J. 1293, 1328 (2015).
241 See, e.g., Wirtz v. Quinn, 2011 IL 111903, ¶¶ 13–14, 953 N.E.2d 899, 904–05 (rejecting
single-subject challenge to a diverse and complex enactment); State ex rel. Ohio Civ. Serv.
Emps. Ass’n v. State, 146 Ohio St. 3d 315, 2016-Ohio-478, 56 N.E.3d 913, ¶ 17 (quoting State
ex rel. Dix v. Celeste, 464 N.E.2d 153, 157 (Ohio 1984)) (“[A] large number of topics [may be
combined] . . . for the purposes of bringing greater order and cohesion to the law.”); Md.
Classified Emps. Ass’n, Inc. v. State, 694 A.2d 937, 943 (Md. 1997); Kastorf, supra note 3, at
1666; cf. Gellert v. State, 522 P.2d 1120, 1122 (Alaska 1974) (“The provision should however,
be construed with considerable breath . . . . [S]tatutes might be restricted unduly in scope and
permissible subject matter, thereby multiplying and complicating the number of necessary
enactment[s] and their interrelationships.”).
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V. CONCLUSION
The single-subject rule presents a paradox. It is “part of the
fundamental structure of legislative power articulated in [the]
constitution”242 of the vast majority of states, and it reflects and seeks
to promote a noble vision of deliberative, majoritarian, and
accountable law-making.243 But it has proven all but impossible to
consistently implement, or even to consistently define.244 Although
some commentators have criticized the courts for excessive deference
to the legislatures and have urged that more aggressive enforcement
will improve legislative performance, that seems unlikely to occur.245
The problems of subject definition and consistent application would
only get worse with more aggressive enforcement efforts.246 Nor is it
clear that more aggressive enforcement would affect legislative
behavior.247 The Oklahoma Supreme Court has taken a more
stringent approach than many other state courts and has frequently
struck down laws on single-subject grounds but the legislature
continues to pass laws the court finds objectionable, leading the court
to complain of “growing weary of admonishing the Legislature for so
flagrantly violating the terms of the Oklahoma Constitution.”248
The single-subject rule’s view of relatively tidy, separate topic-bytopic deliberation and enactment is in tension with the coalitionGregory v. Shurtleff, 2013 UT 18, ¶ 27, 299 P.3d 1098, 1108.
See, e.g., City of Philadelphia v. Commonwealth, 838 A.2d 566, 585 (Pa. 2003) (quoting
Pennsylvania AFL-CIO ex rel. George v. Commonwealth, 757 A.2d 917, 923 (Pa. 2000)); Ruud,
supra note 1, at 399.
244 See Gilbert supra note 2, at 869.
245 See Matsusaka & Hasen, supra note 150, at 399; Florin V. Ivan, Note, Revising Judicial
Application of the Single Subject rule to Initiative Petitions, 66 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 825,
829 (2011).
246 See Matsusaka & Hasen, supra note 150, at 399, 416–17; Kenneth P. Miller, Introduction
Courts as Watchdogs of the Washington State Initiative Process, 24 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1053,
1080 (2001).
247 See Kastorf, supra note 3, at 1658, 1664.
248 Nova Health Sys. v. Edmonson, 2010 OK 21, ¶ 5, 233 P.3d 380, 382. At the time of the
Nova Health decision, the Oklahoma court had found seven violations of the rule over the
preceding two decades. See id. ¶ 4, 233 P.3d at 382 (citing Fent v. State ex rel. Okla. Capital
Improvement Auth., 2009 OK 15, ¶ 1, 214 P.3d 799; Weddington v. Henry, 2008 OK 102, ¶ 1,
202 P.3d 143, 144; Fent v. State ex rel. Office of State Fin., 2008 OK 2, ¶ 30, 184 P.3d 467; 478;
In re Initiative Petition No. 382, 2006 OK 45, ¶ 18, 142 P.3d 400, 409; Morgan v. Daxon, 2001
OK 104, ¶ 1, 49 P.3d 687, 687; Campbell v. White, 856 P.2d 255, 263 (Okla. 1993); Johnson v.
Walters, 819 P.2d 694 (Okla. 1991)). Since then, the court has found at least four more
violations. See Burns v. Cline, 2016 OK 99, ¶ 19, 382 P.3d 1048, 1053; Fent v. Fallin, 2013 OK
107, ¶ 7, 315 P.3d 1023, 1025; Douglas v. Cox Ret. Props, Inc., 2013 OK 37, ¶ 12, 302 P.3d 789,
794; Thomas v. Henry, 2011 OK 53, ¶¶ 31–32, 260 P.3d 1251, 1261–62 (per curiam). The court
also sustained at least one law in the face of a single-subject attack. See In re Application of
Okla. Tpk. Auth. for Approval of not to Exceed $480,000 Okla. Tpk. Sys. Second Senior Lien
Revenue Bonds, Series 2016, 2016 OK 124, ¶ 12, 389 P.3d 318, 321.
242
243
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building and deal-making necessary for the legislative process to
work in practice.249 Comprehensive, multi-topic legislation will often
be essential, if not desirable, in order for the legislature to act at all,
and a proliferation of small, piecemeal measures that would result
from the strict construction of the single-subject rule would not
improve legislative efficiency or, given the time limits many
legislatures are under, legislative deliberation.
Having been a part of the constitutions of most states for roughly
a century and a half, the single-subject rule is likely here to stay, and
as a part of a state’s constitution it deserves some respect if not active
enforcement. It may be that the best approach to the rule is the one
most states take most of the time—broad definitions of subject and
deference to the legislature, with occasional invalidation of the most
egregious combinations of seemingly unrelated subjects.250 This
seems more justified and more likely to occur, paradoxically, not in
the large, complex omnibus measures that advocates of the rule
decry, but which may be crucial for coalition-building and for
comprehensive treatment of a subject, but in smaller bills, combining
just a handful of laws or amendments on discrete topics, which can
be claimed as single subject at only the highest level of abstraction,
likely “amending the Crimes Code”251 or “judicial remedies and
sanctions.”252
In the end, the paradox posed by the single-subject rule is probably
unsolvable.
More aggressive enforcement would disrupt the
legislative process for uncertain gains, and probably still would not
generate a consistent definition of “subject” or a predictable body of
law. Complete non-enforcement would fly in the face of the
requirements of state constitutions.253 General deference with
intermittent enforcement in the most egregious cases—with the
meaning of “egregious” left open—is what we have now and is in
tension with the rule of law values of consistency and
predictability.254 It is probably the least bad approach, but still
unsatisfactory.
The purposes of the single-subject rule—majority rule,
249 See Block, supra note 173, at 250; Daniel B. Rodriguez & Barry R. Weingast, The Paradox
of Expansionist Statutory Interpretations, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1207, 1254 (2007).
250 See Kasper, supra note 45 at 853; Kastorf, supra note 3, at 1639.
251 Leach v. Commonwealth, 141 A.3d 426, 431 (Pa. 2016).
252 Commonwealth v. Neiman, 84 A.3d 603, 613 (Pa. 2013)
253 See Evans & Bannister, supra note 19, at 174 n.73; Jordan E. Pratt, Disregard of
Unconstitutional Laws in the Plural State Executive, 86 MISS. L.J. 881, 909–10 (2017).
254 See Steven J. Burton, Normative Legal Theories: The Case for Pluralism and Balancing,
98 IOWA L. REV. 535, 546 (2013); Kasper, supra note 45, at 853
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deliberation,
transparency,
orderly
procedure,
public
accountability255—are surely desirable legislative process goals, if not
essential to legislative legitimacy. But the experience of the singlesubject rule suggests that a judicially-enforceable constitutional
requirement may not be the best way to achieve those ends.

255

See Block, supra note 173, at 238, 251; Ruud, supra note 19, at 391.

